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Abstract 
In today’s business environment, the trend towards more product variety and customization is unbroken. Due to this development, the need of 
agile and reconfigurable production systems emerged to cope with various products and product families. To design and optimize production
systems as well as to choose the optimal product matches, product analysis methods are needed. Indeed, most of the known methods aim to 
analyze a product or one product family on the physical level. Different product families, however, may differ largely in terms of the number and 
nature of components. This fact impedes an efficient comparison and choice of appropriate product family combinations for the production
system. A new methodology is proposed to analyze existing products in view of their functional and physical architecture. The aim is to cluster
these products in new assembly oriented product families for the optimization of existing assembly lines and the creation of future reconfigurable 
assembly systems. Based on Datum Flow Chain, the physical structure of the products is analyzed. Functional subassemblies are identified, and 
a functional analysis is performed. Moreover, a hybrid functional and physical architecture graph (HyFPAG) is the output which depicts the 
similarity between product families by providing design support to both, production system planners and product designers. An illustrative
example of a nail-clipper is used to explain the proposed methodology. An industrial case study on two product families of steering columns of 
thyssenkrupp Presta France is then carried out to give a first industrial evaluation of the proposed approach. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the fast development in the domain of 
communication and an ongoing trend of digitization and
digitalization, manufacturing enterprises are facing important
challenges in today’s market environments: a continuing
tendency towards reduction of product development times and
shortened product lifecycles. In addition, there is an increasing
demand of customization, being at the same time in a global 
competition with competitors all over the world. This trend, 
which is inducing the development from macro to micro 
markets, results in diminished lot sizes due to augmenting
product varieties (high-volume to low-volume production) [1]. 
To cope with this augmenting variety as well as to be able to
identify possible optimization potentials in the existing
production system, it is important to have a precise knowledge
of the product range and characteristics manufactured and/or 
assembled in this system. In this context, the main challenge in
modelling and analysis is now not only to cope with single 
products, a limited product range or existing product families,
but also to be able to analyze and to compare products to define
new product families. It can be observed that classical existing
product families are regrouped in function of clients or features.
However, assembly oriented product families are hardly to find. 
On the product family level, products differ mainly in two
main characteristics: (i) the number of components and (ii) the
type of components (e.g. mechanical, electrical, electronical). 
Classical methodologies considering mainly single products 
or solitary, already existing product families analyze the
product structure on a physical level (components level) which 
causes difficulties regarding an efficient definition and
comparison of different product families. Addressing this 
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Abstract 
In practice cost estimators typically assume that cost risk and uncertainty continuously decrease across the whole product life cycle. Industry 
case studies and semi-structured interviews indicate that while cost risk and uncertainty decreases between technology readiness levels / stage 
gates, it increases when technology readiness levels / stage gates change. This increase can lead to cost risk and uncertainty levels above those 
at previous technology readiness levels / stage gates. This difference between assumptions in practice a d evidence from case studies and semi-
structured interviews may lead t  the over- and / or under-assignment of capital reserves ver time, thus resultin  in binding project capital 
unnecessarily and / or the need to increase projects budgets in an unplanned manner. Further research is suggested regarding the scale of 
changes in cost risk and uncertainty when technology readiness level changes / stage gates are arrived at in order to i pr ve robustness of 
forecasting efforts. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing competition and regulation are raising the 
pressure on high value manufacturing organisations to 
innovate their products more and more rapidly [1]. Innovation 
is by default fraught by significant risk to and uncertainty of 
the accuracy of estimated unit and support costs [2,3,4]. This 
is not only due to the lack of historical data for orientation, but 
also due to fluctuations over time (time-dependency) [5,6]. 
The impact of these fluctuations may lead to the over- and / or 
under-assignment of capital reserves over time, thus resulting 
in binding project capital unnecessarily and / or the need to 
increase projects budgets in an unplanned manner [7]. 
Contemporary forecasting techniques thus do not always 
prove robust and it is hence not uncommon in practice for 
financial reserves to be held at higher progra me levels to be 
flexed in the case of need. This involves the complex shifting 
of dynamic portfolio level reserves based primarily on tacit 
knowledge. To date these fluctuations have not been 
researched in detail primarily due to the inability to forecast 
cost risk and uncertainty (over time) without prior information 
[5]. The paper examines this time-dependent cost risk and 
uncertainty from ideation to production readiness for high 
value manufacturing products based upon the visualisation of 
uncertainty ranges over time which represent the paradigm 
applied in relevant forecasting [8,9].   
Section 2 summarizes the concept of cost risk and 
uncertainty propagation based on a review of literature from 
industry and research. Section 3 shares the results of multiple 
quantitative and qualitative industry case studies, followed by 
a discussion of case studies in Section 4. Section 5 concludes 
the paper and provides recommendations for future research. 
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[5]. The paper examines this time-dependent cost risk and 
uncertainty from ideation to production readiness for high 
value manufacturing products based upon the visualisation of 
uncertainty ranges over time which represent the paradigm 
applied in relevant forecasting [8,9].   
Section 2 summarizes the concept of cost risk and 
uncertainty propagation based on a review of literature from 
industry and research. Section 3 shares the results of multiple 
quantitative and qualitative industry case studies, followed by 
a discussion of case studies in Section 4. Section 5 concludes 
the paper and provides recommendations for future research. 
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2. Literature review 
The progression of cost risk and uncertainty can be 
considered analogous to the progression of cost estimate 
maturity / readiness levels [10]. Such levels are discussed in 
four key assessment frameworks starting with Bauman´s 
“flexible boundaries” in 1958 [11], revisited by the AACE 
International Recommended Best Practice 18R-97 “Cost 
Estimate Classification System” [12] in 1997, followed by 
Boehm´s COCOMO II “Uncertainty Funnel” in 1981 and 
2000 [13,14], and then the NASA Cost Estimating Handbook 
“CRL Designation” in 2004 [10]. No such information was 
found in a number of wide spread industry standards such as 
put forward by NAVSEA [15], NATO [16,17], the UK 
Ministry of Defence [18], the US Air Force [19], or the US 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis [20], NASA [21,22,23], or the 
US Space Systems Cost Analysis Group [24]. Common to the 
key assessment frameworks identified is that they describe 
cost estimate accuracy ranges during the whole product 
lifecycle through boundaries of the shape of propagation as a 
result of (project) management actions. 
Bauman´s work [11] is based on analysis of cost estimates 
for 10 chemical plants for three project stages; the first stage 
(Study) had a cost estimate range of -29% / +3%, the second 
stage (Scope) a range -11% / +12%, and the third state 
(Project Control) a range of -7% / +6%. The AACE 
International Recommended Best Practice 18R-97 [12] uses 
five estimate classes from Class 5 “Concept Screening” (-20% 
to -50% / +30% to +100%), Class 4 “Study or Feasibility” (-
15% to -30% / +20% to +50%), Class 3 “Budget 
Authorization or Control” (-10% to -20% / +10% to +30%), 
Class 2 “Control or Bid/Tender” (-5% to -15% / +5% to 
+20%) and Class 1 “Check Estimate or Bid/Tender (-3% to -





























Fig. 1. Uncertainty progression for key frameworks 
Boehm [13,14] discusses these ranges as part of the 
COCOMO model for software cost estimation later refines 
these with the concept of the “uncertainty funnel”. He 
suggests ranges from the perspective of “Estimate Variability” 
for the stages “Initial Concept” (-75% / +400%), “Approved 
Product Definition” (-50% / +200%), “Requirements 
Complete” (-33% / +150%), “User Interface Design 
Complete” (-20% / +125%), “Detailed Design Complete” (-
10% / +110%), and “Software Complete” (+/- 0%). The 
NASA Cost Estimating Handbook [10] discusses cost 
readiness levels (CRL) aligned against technology readiness 
levels based on project complexity and adequacy of 
estimating methods. Cost estimate uncertainty ranges are then 
presented for CRL 4 “Cost fit for very preliminary 
engineering decisions and very preliminary budget use” at +/- 
45%, CRL 5 “Cost fit for preliminary engineering decisions 
and preliminary budget use” at +/- 35%, CRL 6 “Cost fit for 
PDR engineering decisions and standards. PDR budget use at 
+/- 25%”, CRL 7 “Cost fit for firm engineering decisions and 
firm budget commitments” at +/- 15%, and CRL 8 “Cost fit 
for very firm engineering decisions and very firm budget 
commitments” at +/-5 %.  
For comparative purposes the researchers chose common 
structural denominators as represented by the three stage 
milestone structure “Study”, “Scope” and “Project” 
originating from Bauman [11]. Specifically (a) for the NASA 
Cost Estimating Handbook the CRLs 4, 6 and 8 were used, (b) 
for COCOMO II the phases Initial Concept, Requirements 
Complete, and Detailed Design were used, and (c) for AACE 
the Classes 5, 4 and 1 were used. Figure 1 illustrates the high / 
low boundaries of the four key assessment frameworks 
normalized across these three generic stages. 
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3. Industry case studies 
The propagation behavior of cost uncertainty during the 
whole product life cycle is determined by the rise and 
retirement of risks and their associated probability 
distributions across this time period. Based upon a review of 
industry practice, three key approaches exist for evaluating 
this propagation: discrete numeric, discrete gross risk (DGR) 
and continuous DGR. DGR describes a range of generic 
probability-impact values from “1” for very low probability / 
very low impact to 29 for very high probability / very high 
impact based on custom scoring schemes. These three 
approaches are applied to a whole product life cycle view. 
This is typically managed through a stage gate process and 
each stage gate is defined by series of questions and intended 
to examine treatments of risk threats raised previously in 
hindsight, provide insight to new risk threats typically 
encountered when entering the next stage gate phase and 
provide foresight of generic and specific risk threats expected 
at and between future stage gates. 
3.1 Industry case study – discrete numeric 
In a chosen industry scenario the stage gates start with a 
reflection on innovation and opportunity selection (Gate 0.1), 
followed by Preliminary Concept Definition (Gates 1.1 - 
1.2B), to then consider Full Concept Definition (Gates 2.1A 
and 2.1B), Product Realisation (Gates 3.1 – 3.6B), Production 
and In-Service Support (Gates 4.1 and 4.2), Continuing In-
Service Support (Gate 5.1) and then end with End of Life 
Disposal (Gate 6.1). In the chosen industry scenario a total of 
2143 questions are raised during the stage gates whereby a 
total of 499 are specifically related to cost. Each question can 
be considered to inherently represent a risk threat or risk 
opportunity and thus if the number of (cost) risks considered 
at each stage gate changes (and if each risk has an associated 
uncertainty range associated with it regarding impact) then 
cost risk uncertainty should also change over time. Important 
to note is that in the industry scenario the focus is primarily 
on risk threats and not risk opportunities. Hereby it is also 
important to consider that the duration for which risks remain 
valid may extend beyond the next stage gate. 
At each stage gate it is also common to include a financial 
review which is intended to assure that any financial resources 
reserved for unplanned cost changes are adequate and 
adjusted as necessary. Adjustment of financial reserves can 
mean the provision of additional funds / release of reserves 
which are not needed to the organisation for other use. 
Figure 2 illustrates an industry example of the discrete 
numeric approach which focuses on the total number of 
generic questions at each stage gate of a whole product life 
cycle management process. The total height of each column 
represents the total number of questions, whereby the light 
grey section represents those questions specifically related to 
cost risks. The three stage milestone structure “Study”, 
“Scope” and “Project” was aligned to Gate 1.2B “Business 
Concept Review”, Gate 2.1B “Programme Commitment 




Fig.2. Industry case study – discrete numeric 
3.2 Industry case study – discrete gross risk 
The same data used for the discrete numeric approach was 
then examined using the DGR approach for a single aerospace 
component project for 10 exemplary risks as shown in Table 
1. The numbers represent the DGR at the key three generic 
stage gates previously chosen based on Bauman []11: 
Table 1. Industry case study – discrete gross risk 
Risk ID DGR Gate 1.2B (“Study”) 
DGR Gate 2.1B 
(“Scope”) 
DGR Gate 3.6B 
(“Project”) 
1 22 22 22 
2 8 8 8 
3 8   
4 27 27 27 
5 5 5 5 
6 18 18  
7 3 3 3 
8 12 12  
9 12 12 12 
10 22 22 22 
SUM 137 129 99 
 
The duration of the risks is given by the grey shading, i.e. 
risk ID 1 exists at gates 1.2B, 2.1B and 3.6B, while risk ID 3 
exists only at gate 1.2B. At each gate the sum DGR is 
determined based on the sum of individual DGRs at that time. 
The individual risks may arise before or at the stage gate and 
retire at or after the stage gate. Over the duration of the risk a 
uniform probability distribution was applied due to the lack of 
further information. 
3.3 Industry case study – continuous gross risk 
While the discrete numeric approach counted the number 
of risks over the course of the whole product life cycle  (see 
Figure 2), and the DGR approach counted the potential impact 
over time for the three generic stages, the DGR fluctuation 
between these can now be evaluated.as shown in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3. Industry case study – continuous sum gross risk 
The x-axis shows the progression over time whereby the 
three key generic stage gates 1.2B, 2.1B and 3.6B are 
highlighted by vertical dotted lines. While each risk 
probability number will have an uncertainty range associated 
with it, this can be disregarded for purposes of the initial 
evaluation, although a generic +/- range for each stage gate 
could be applied using one of the models discussed in the 
literature review. Examining the sum DGR at the stage gates 
it can be seen that at gate 1.2B it exceeds that of the previous 
gates and the sum DGR at gate 3.2A exceeds that from gate 
2.1B. This could suggest that the uncertainty “cone” does not 
begin to come into effect before the project has achieved 
approximately gate 3.2A (approximately 1/3 of the way into 
the project). Examining the sum DGR behaviour between the 
gates it can be seen that it does not consistently drop between 
























Fig. 4. Results of cost estimating subject matter expert community survey 
It is this behaviour which points to the challenge investigated 
by the paper. In these phases the sum DGR rises between 
stage gates and would, if they became issue, require more 
than expected and assigned contingency. 
3.4 Semi-structured interviews 
In order to explore the perceived progression of cost risk 
and uncertainty over the course of the whole product life 
cycle an online case study as designed as a survey and shared 
with the cost estimation communities of two major UK 
aerospace manufacturers in March 2019. Using a generic 
probability impact diagram, participants were asked to assess 
the risk threat and risk opportunity (on a scale of 1 (very low) 
to 29 (very high) for seven generic whole product life cycle 
stages (Stage 0: Opportunity Definition, Stage 1: Preliminary 
Concept (Demonstrator), Stage 2: Full Concept (Prototype), 
Stage 3: Product Realisation (First unit), Stage 4: Production 
and In-Service Support (Series production), Stage 5: 
Continuing In-Service (Maintenance only), and Stage 6: End 
of Life Disposal). A total of 25 qualified responses were 
received and the results shown in Figure 4. For both risk 
threat and risk opportunity the mean of the response values is 
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4. Discussion 
Based on the results of the literature review and case 
studies an attempt can be made to compare and contrast their 
differing perspectives. Additionally an Aerospace Industry 
Project Database case study created by an UK aerospace 
manufacturing company based on data from over 400 projects 
in 2017 and 2018 was added to the four key assessment 
frameworks and interview results. In this industry database 
the cost estimate readiness level (ERL) of projects as they 
evolved through the whole product life cycle stage gate 
process (see Figure 2) was assessed. Values from the ERLs 1, 
5 and 9 were used to represent the generic three stage gated 
“Study”, “Scope” and “Project”. The comparative results are 
shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Uncertainty assessment framework boundaries 










Bauman Boundary Low -29 -11 -7 
Bauman Boundary High 3 12 6 
NASA CEH Boundary Low -45 -25 -5 
NASA CEH Boundary High 45 25 5 
COCOMO II Boundary Low -75 -33 -10 
COCOMO II Boundary High 400 150 110 
AACE 18R-97 Boundary Low Low -20 -15 -3 
AACE 18R-97  Boundary High Low 30 20 3 
AACE 18R-97 Boundary Low High -50 -30 -10 
AACE 18R-97  Boundary High Low 100 50 15 
Semi-Structured Interviews Low (Mean) -21 -16 -9 
Semi-Structured Interviews High (Mean) 18 20 14 
Aerospace Industry Project Database Low -93 -44 -5 
Aerospace Industry Project Database High 1,280 80 5 
 
The high and low boundaries are then averaged as shown 
in Figure 5. The shape remains funnel-like and the risk 
opportunities remain significantly smaller than the risk 
threats. The imposed linear trend-lines suggest an iterative 
decrease of high / low boundaries which may obscure the 













Fig. 5. Aggregated assessment frame boundaries 
The assessment framework boundaries shown in Table 2 
suggests that while all data sets provide discrete uncertainty 
range data for each of the three generic stage gates, it is the 
ensuing application of trend-lines on that data which anchors 
a perception of a continuous decrease in the value of high and 
low boundaries. The implicit suggestion is therefore that the 
value between the stage gate values the “cone” or “funnel” 
paradigm. This stands in contrast to Figure 3. 
Of note is also that the application of trend-lines is a 
statistical method which by default requires a minimum 
amount of prior data which can be argued to be at least 41 
data sets [25]. In the case of Baumann [11] only 10 data sets 
were used and a closer examination also indicates that the 
high boundary of the “Scope” phase is higher than the high 
boundary of the previous “Study” phase. Also of note is that 
in the NASA data [10] high and low boundaries always have 
the same absolute value which suggests that these may not be 
based on actual project data, while the AACE [12] boundaries 
for high and low also include a spread of these boundary 
values. 
Any aggregated data and models derived from these will 
by default have degrees of uncertainty associated with them. 
Indeed this uncertainty is inherent in any measurement based 
approach and only the AACE model [12] points to this 
uncertainty for the boundaries themselves. It is especially the 
use of boundary trend lines in this respect which anchor 
expectations without emphasis of the fact that this 
propagation behavior is only due to project management 
interaction. Without this interaction the researchers suggest 
that the uncertainty related to a whole product life cycle 
would remain constant at best.   
While the examples from literature and surveys suggest 
that the uncertainty cone paradigm can be applied a 
comparison against case studies suggest that this can only be 
considered an approximation under the assumption that 
management interventions properly address a continuously 
growing number of risk threats. 
The stage gate process question analysis (see Figure 2) 
thus points to the growing nature of risk and uncertainty over 
time, the single product risk analysis (see Table 1) suggests 
that while between stage gates the sum gross risk and 
uncertainty will drop as a result of management intervention, 
it is at the next stage gate that the stage gate process injects a 
number of new risk threats whose sum gross risk may well 
exceed that of the previous stage gate. 
In this respect the predictive capability of a paradigm such 
as the “uncertainty cone” can be considered as helpful for 
informing affordability discussion as suggested by Bankole et 
al. [26] or Erkoyuncu et al. [2] in relation to bidding stage 
decision making. This decision making support does however 
need to be tempered by the default anchoring of perceptions 
through the visualisation as a “funnel” shape as pointed out by 
Kreye at al. [27] which may suggest an illusion of 
predictability as highlighted among others by Ziliak [28]. 
Overall though it can be considered a helpful technique for 
supporting estimation without or with very little data similar 
to the creation of cost estimation models under such 
conditions as argued by Smart [29].  
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Fig. 3. Industry case study – continuous sum gross risk 
The x-axis shows the progression over time whereby the 
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highlighted by vertical dotted lines. While each risk 
probability number will have an uncertainty range associated 
with it, this can be disregarded for purposes of the initial 
evaluation, although a generic +/- range for each stage gate 
could be applied using one of the models discussed in the 
literature review. Examining the sum DGR at the stage gates 
it can be seen that at gate 1.2B it exceeds that of the previous 
gates and the sum DGR at gate 3.2A exceeds that from gate 
2.1B. This could suggest that the uncertainty “cone” does not 
begin to come into effect before the project has achieved 
approximately gate 3.2A (approximately 1/3 of the way into 
the project). Examining the sum DGR behaviour between the 
gates it can be seen that it does not consistently drop between 
























Fig. 4. Results of cost estimating subject matter expert community survey 
It is this behaviour which points to the challenge investigated 
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to 29 (very high) for seven generic whole product life cycle 
stages (Stage 0: Opportunity Definition, Stage 1: Preliminary 
Concept (Demonstrator), Stage 2: Full Concept (Prototype), 
Stage 3: Product Realisation (First unit), Stage 4: Production 
and In-Service Support (Series production), Stage 5: 
Continuing In-Service (Maintenance only), and Stage 6: End 
of Life Disposal). A total of 25 qualified responses were 
received and the results shown in Figure 4. For both risk 
threat and risk opportunity the mean of the response values is 
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the same absolute value which suggests that these may not be 
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for high and low also include a spread of these boundary 
values. 
Any aggregated data and models derived from these will 
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Indeed this uncertainty is inherent in any measurement based 
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comparison against case studies suggest that this can only be 
considered an approximation under the assumption that 
management interventions properly address a continuously 
growing number of risk threats. 
The stage gate process question analysis (see Figure 2) 
thus points to the growing nature of risk and uncertainty over 
time, the single product risk analysis (see Table 1) suggests 
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5. Conclusions and future work 
The number of risks arising during the whole product life 
cycle increases continuously, whereby the overall number of 
risks relevant at and between stage gates fluctuates depending 
on various factors. 
Sum gross risk may well decrease between stage gates, but 
will then increase by default on progression through the stage 
gate since new questions with relevant risk threats become 
relevant. The relationship between the sum gross risk values 
at stage gates will thus depend primarily on the degree that the 
risks raised at one stage gate have been mitigated before 
entering the next stage gate phase. Not only may a stage gate 
in itself introduce risk threats exceeding those of the previous 
stage gate in value, there may well be a “carry-over” of risk 
threats which have not been mitigated (or continue in 
relevance) since the risk expiration date may be later. In 
consequence the uncertainty ranges will fluctuate at / between 
stage gates. 
In summary therefore cost risk and uncertainty propagate 
dynamically across the whole product life cycle and during 
this propagation it may increase to values and ranges greater 
than at previous points in time. This again suggests that the 
wide-spread paradigm of the “uncertainty cone” may 
represent primarily the intent of project management activities 
than anything else. This then supports the need for regular re-
visitation of cost risk and uncertainty assessments and 
forecasts to ensure progression against the planned path of 
cost risk and uncertainty reduction. This difference between 
assumptions in practice and evidence from case studies and 
semi-structured interviews may lead to the over- and / or 
under-assignment of capital reserves over time, thus resulting 
in binding project capital unnecessarily and / or the need to 
increase projects budgets in an unplanned manner.  
Further research is suggested regarding the scale of 
changes in cost risk and uncertainty when technology 
readiness level changes / stage gates are arrived at. 
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